Gold bonds had a proven track record. They had financed the construction of transcontinental railways and transoceanic shipping, as well as the metamorphosis of the U.S. from a poor agricultural country to become the world’s greatest industrial power during the last quarter of the 19th century. Gold was a great financial resource that could have financed a comparable metamorphosis for the rest of the world during the last quarter of the 20th century. It was not to be. Instead, gold was forcibly removed from the international monetary system and condemned to idleness. The world started its slow descent to hell.
Dannemeyer foresaw the tsunami of red ink that was to inundate the U.S. when it turned from the world’s greatest creditor to become its greatest debtor nation. The twin deficits: the budget and the trade deficit were to sap the country’s vitality and to lead to the dismantling of its once legendary great industries.
Our blueprint to refinance the debt of the U.S. in terms of long term gold bonds was ready as the Reagan administration drew to a close and the Bush administration took over. Dannemeyer led a delegation of ten Republican congressmen to the Oval Office to present the plan to George Bush, Sr., in October, 1989. The event was reported on the front page of The New York Times accompanied by a photo. Dana Rohrabacher, California Congressman (who presently serves his 12th term in Congress) was a member of the delegation and he can confirm the accuracy of this recollection. The only point on the agenda of the historic meeting was the gold bond refinancing of the U.S. debt. President Bush listened attentively to the presentation of Mr. Dannemeyer. Afterwards he turned to his Treasury Secretary who was also present, suggesting that his staff and the staff of Mr. Dannemeyer ought to get together and iron out the wrinkles of the plan and come back with a joint recommendation.
Things were looking up. A meeting with the Treasury staff was scheduled. But just before it was to take place there was a call from the Treasury that the meeting had to be rescheduled because of “important other business”. What business could be more important, we were left wondering, than the business of averting the collision of the Titanic with the iceberg straight ahead? There was a similar call just before the rescheduled meeting and the episode was repeated again. It was clear that the Treasury staff was sabotaging the wishes of President Bush....
One obvious objection is irrelevance: TPIS now provide inflation protection to bondholders, so there's no need for Treasury securities denominated in gold. Another objection is lack of need: the Treasury can borrow at low rates in nominal terms now, so why would gold bonds help? Another one pertains to the gold bull market: doing so would have been a losing proposition for the treasury since 2001.
The only time in which the argument for gold bonds would be compelling would be during conditions like 1981, when rates were in double digits and gold had stalled after 1979-80's parabolic blowoff. Had the U.S. Treasury issued gold bonds in '81, it would not only have paid a much lower rate but also would have won on gold falling subsequently. Conversely, the worst time to have done so would have been the same time that then-Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown was unloading some of the U.K's gold: 1999-2001.
Give the clime nowadays, the only way that the Treasury would issue gold bonds would be if public and Congressional pressure forced Sec. Geithner's hand. Prof. Fekete's idea does deserve a hearing, and would be a good idea for the Treasury should rates go up to double digits and gold stabilize after another blow-off top.
No comments:
Post a Comment